Diskussionspapier Nr. 25 erschienen

Nr. 25: Koch (2018): Investments and capital stocks as estimations for health infrastructure in the European Countries (EU28)

Health is, beside of other services and commodities, e.g. education or social housing, a merit, quasi-public good. Since private provision of health services would presumptively not be sufficient in quality and quantity, one could argue there is a responsibility by the state to provide a sufficient amount of health services to its population. However, it is difficult to quantify the sufficient amount with public goods, in general. One required component of the healthcare provision is infrastructure, such as hospitals, operation theaters etc. and its related equipment, such as beds, imaging devices etc. To estimate the existing infrastructure in the European countries, without an on-the-ground evaluation, we use investment time series for tangible and intangible assets (Gross Fixed Capital Formation) reported to Eurostat and compute Capital Stock for each country, using the Perpetual Inventory Method (PIM) considering country specific depreciation rates and growth rates for each included asset. Based on the last computed capital stock in 2016 as benchmark, we evaluate the effect of the global financial crises in 2008. Furthermore, we run two future scenarios for EU28 in total and each country: (I) how much annual investment is needed, such that the capital stocks keep pace with annual GDP growth rates and (II) how much annual investment is needed, such that the 2016 capital stock per capita can be maintained in the future.



Diskussionspapier Nr. 24 erschienen

Nr. 24: Herrmann, Emrich, Frenger& Rasche (2018): First Step Developing A Early-Warning System Against Corruption For Sports Associations

The business model of sports is based on trust, reputation and fairness. In recent years sports associations have often engaged in crime, corruption and non-compliance, which has damaged the reputation of sports. A professional compliance tool to counteract the loss of trust is still missing, an early-warning system for sports organisations could provide a solution. It simulates how they react to non-tolerable instances of corruption, doping or violations of competitive integrity. The aim of this article is to present the first step developing an early-warning system for sports associations. The approach of New Institutional Economics was chosen to be the theoretical framework to understand the characteristics of corrupt deals and from that identify indicators that uncover corruption at an early stage. To support the normative process of indicator finding a literature research and a case study were carried out. The results indicate that corrupt deals involve three phases and that the relationship between the corrupt partners is central. Regarding to the strong bonds in corrupt relationships a lack of term limitations, no rotation in leadership positions, missing systems of whistleblowing or insufficient transparency could be possible indicators for corruption and non-compliance in sports associations.



Diskussionspapier Nr. 23 erschienen

Ackermann & Follert (2018). Einige bewertungstheoretische Anmerkungen zur Marktwertanalyse der Plattform transfermarkt.de

Zahlreiche sportökonomische Studien beziehen sich auf die durch die Plattform transfer-markt.de bereitgestellten „Marktwerte“. Eine theoretische Betrachtung, was unter diesem Begriff zu verstehen ist und ob die ermittelten Zahlen einer bewertungstheoretischen Fundie-rung genügen, bleibt unberücksichtigt. Der vorliegende Beitrag möchte zur Schließung dieser Forschungslücke beitragen und analysiert die Marktwertanalyse von transfermarkt.de im Lichte der modernen Bewertungstheorie. Es zeigt sich, dass die „Marktwerte“ zwar zu Argu-mentationszwecken in Verhandlungen eingesetzt werden können, eine Entscheidungsunter-stützung im Vorfeld eines Spielertransfers hingegen nicht möglich ist.




Diskussionspapier Nr. 22 erschienen

Thieme & Winkelhake (2018): Zur Wirkung moralischer Appelle als Nudging? Ergebnisse aus verhaltensökonomischen Experimenten

In den Diskussionen zur Nutzung von Nudges zur Anregung gewünschten Verhaltens spielen Normen eine zentrale Rolle. Mit Hilfe einer Variation des Diktatorspiels gehen wir der Frage nach, ob der Verweis auf eine Gleichverteilungsnorm eine Verhaltensänderung im Sinne des Nudgings bewirkt. Wir prüfen weiter, ob die Wirkung der Gleichverteilungsnorm von der Größe der Gruppe abhängt, die von der Teilung profitiert. Unsere Ergebnisse zeigen einen mittleren bis großen Effekt bei Verweis auf eine Gleichverteilungsnorm. Dieser Effekt scheint jedoch unabhängig von der Größe der profitierenden Gruppe zu sein. Die Ergebnisse erweisen sich als robust gegenüber Diktatorspielen immanenten Mannaeffekten.







Diskussionspapier Nr. 21 erschienen

Behrens, Emrich, Hämmerle & Pierdzioch (2017): Match Quality, Crowding Out, and Crowding In: Empirical Evidence for German Sports Clubs

Volunteering can be interpreted as a process of search that matches volunteer labor supply with demand for volunteer work by voluntary organizations like sports clubs. Using novel data from an online questionnaire study of German sports club members, we constructed a match quality index (MQI) that measures the outcome of this search process: the congruence of motives for doing volunteer work and the utility experiences derived from volunteer work. The MQI is higher on average for volunteers who would increase their work effort if their sports club received additional public subsidies or other volunteers would increase their work (crowding-in effect). The MQI is also higher on average for volunteers who would increase their work effort if other volunteers would decrease their work (crowding-out effect). Furthermore, match quality exhibits a positive correlation with important outcomes of volunteering like volunteer satisfaction, labor supply, and volunteers’ confidence that they meet the requirements of their volunteer positions. The MQI is positively correlated with a bridging, but also with a bonding element of social capital.